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During the last 25 years, the Chinese economy has experienced significant changes: the 
centrally planned economy has been reformed gradually into a market economy; the 
traditional agricultural economy is becoming more and more a modern industrial economy. 
In a dynamic two-sector-two-segment model we demonstrate that the economic reform has 
changed the industrialization mechanism in China. It released a decentralized industrialization 
process beside the centrally planned Soviet-type industrialization. This decentralized 
industrialization is shown to be the ultimate driving force of the transition from plan to 
market in China. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Chinese economy experienced one of the fastest growth periods of all countries 
in the world over the last 25 years. It seems to be on the way towards a successful 
transition from a planned to a market economy, while many other post-socialist 
countries suffer from economic and social problems - the so called transition crisis. The 
question naturally arises: what are the specific reasons for the Chinese economy to 
perform differently than the other post-socialist countries? There is a large body of 
literature on this issue. Chow (2002) summarises the transition process from a historical 
perspective. He stresses, especially, the importance of the traditional value of education 
in the Chinese society and its role in building-up of human capital for the success of the 
transition process. Byrd (1987), Byrd (1989) and Byrd (1991) establish a general 
equilibrium theory for the co-existence of plan and market in the Chinese economy and 
provide a theoretical description the market mechanism in the transition process. 
Weitzman and Xu (1994) discuss the role of the township village enterprises in the 
transition process. Kwok, Parish and Xu (1990) investigate impact of the urbanization 
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process on the economic development in China. McKinnon (1994) and Lardy (2000) 
investigate the role of the financial system in the Chinese transition process. Martin 
(1993) and Zhang (1998) construct short-run computable general equilibrium models to 
carry out policy analyze during the transition process. 
We argue that the economic reform has changed the mechanism of the Soviet-type 
centralized industrialization that prevailed before the economic reform in China and has 
released a decentralized industrialization process. A market segment that consists of 
township-village enterprises and private companies emerged during the decentralized 
industrialization process. Taking advantage of the disequilibrium generated by the 
central planning in the economy, the market segment grows much faster than the 
planned segment that consists of the state-owned enterprises. Consequently, the 
proportion of the market activities in the economy becomes larger and larger and the 
proportion of the planned activities become smaller and smaller. This forms what we 
call extrinsic transition. Facing the faster growth in the market segment, the planned 
segment has been forced to adjust itself to the new situation in the economy by diverse 
reform efforts. This forced adjustment makes the planned segment more and more 
market-like. This forms what we call intrinsic transition.  
To study this specific feature of the transition process in China, we formulate a 
two-sector-two-segment model in Section 2 to embed the economic transition into the 
process of the decentralized industrialization.
1 Using the theoretical concept given in 
Byrd (1987) and Byrd (1989), we define an equilibrium of the model as the equilibrium 
of the market segment that corrects the disequilibrium generated by the planned segment. 
As in Martin (1994) and Zhang (1998) the temporal equilibrium is solved by using the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) method. However, unlike in Martin (1994) and 
Zhang (1998), where they use the computed equilibrium to analysis of the effects of 
diverse reform policies, we focus on the determinants of the growth in the two segments. 
We study the conditions for a successful transition. In Section 3 we analyze the impact 
of different factors that lead to the faster growth in the market segment and henceforth 
change the long run evolution path of the transition. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.    A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR TRANSITION PROCESS IN CHINA 
 
2.1.  Model  Setting 
 
At the outset, there exists a certain productive capacity in the planned economic 
segment already. This subsystem bears the basic features of a centrally planned 
economy: 
 
1 For more detailed description of this historic perspective of the transition process, see Chow (2002) and 
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1) The prices in this segment are fixed (determined by the planning authority). 
2) There exists no equilibrium in this segment. 
3) The production structure is rigid (shares of investment products and consumption 
products do not react to the demand situation). 
 
The market economic segment, contrary to the planned economic segment, is a 
newly emerged subsystem. The functioning of this subsystem carries the basic features 
of a free market economy: 
1) The producers are price-taker and they are in pursuit of maximal profits under 
given conditions on the market. 
2) The prices response to the demand and the supply on the market and, thus keep 
supply and demand in balance. 
3) The allocation of resources is determined according to the supply and    demand  on 
the market. 
 
We consider the economy as a closed one
2 with an agricultural and an industrial 
sector, each of which produces a homogenous commodity. The output of agricultural 
good is consumed only. The industrial output may be consumed or invested.
3
 
2.2.  The  Two-Segment-Two-Sector-Model 
 
Equations for the Planned Segment 
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2 Through the assumption of a closed economy we neglect the impact of international trade and foreign 
investment on the transition and industrialisation process. The importance of international trade and foreign 
on the industrialisation can be seen in Perkins (1994). 
3 In the development-theoretical literature as by Fei and Ranis (1961), and Jorgenson (1961) the industrial 
output is admitted for both consumption and investment purposes. PU CHEN AND CHIHYING HSIAO  116 
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tions describe the activities in the planned segment. The detailed 
la
ment is only engaged in the industrial production. (1p) is the production equation of 
the planned segment. The production function F is assumed to be twice differentiable 
with  0 > ′ F  and  0 < ′ ′ F  with constant return to scale. (2p) says the planned output 
consists of planned consumption goods and the planned investment goods. The planned 
price  e plann ge rate are exogenously determined by the planning authority. 
(3p) describes the cost minimizing behaviour in the planned segment, which determines 
the labour demand of the planned segment under full utilization of capital and given real 
wage rate. (4p) gives the rate of return of capital. (5p) is the nominal demand for 
consumption goods. We use here the classic assumption that the labour incomes are 
totally used for consumption and the capital incomes are partly used for consumption. 
(6p) is the demand for investment. (7p) expresses the Kornai’s hypothesis of the 
“constant relation
and th ed wa
4” that says the ratio of output for consumption and for investment is 
planned as a constant. (8p) expresses the consequence of the inflexibility in the planned 
segment that there is always a shortage in consumption goods, i.e., we assume that 
0 ≥ E.  
 
uations for the Market Segment 
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he above 19 Equations describe the activities in the market segment. (1m) and (2m) 
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 the agricultural production and the industrial production, respectively. The 
production functions the same as in the planned segment. (4m) says the allocation of the 
capital resource is fully utilized in the two production sectors. (5m), (6m), (7m) and 
(8m) describe the cost minimizing behaviour of the producer. (9m) and (10m) indicate 
that the total labour resource is allocated in the planned segment and the market segment. 
(11m) says the allocation of the capital resource is flexible in the market segment such 
that the rates of return of capital are equal in both the industrial sector and the 
agricultural sector. (12m) describes the difference of the wage rates between the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). This 
difference is grounded by the common practice of SOEs who provide traditionally many 
kinds of subsidies and benefits for the employees in addition to the nominal wages, so 
that 1 0 < < E ν . (13m) is the minimum wage function. It says the market real wage 
canno er than the existence minimum  E δ   as long as there is still labour reserve 
that is willing to move from the agricultural se r into the industrial sector. (14m) is the 
demand for the agricultural output that is assumed to have a linear relation to the labour 
force. (15m) and (16m) are demand functions for the consumption goods and for the 
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genous variables (See Appendix 2, p. 25). The functioning of the model can be 
summarized as follows. The planned segment always tends to focus on the production of 
investment goods and thus generates an excess demand for consumption goods. The 
market segment tends to cover this excess demand and keeps the whole economy in 
equilibrium. Due to the different prices and wages in the two segments the rates of 
return of capital are different. The higher rate of return of capital in the market segment 
results in faster growth of the capital stock in the market segment than in the planned PU CHEN AND CHIHYING HSIAO  118 
segment. The share of the market segments in the economy is increasing while the share 
of the planned segment is decreasing. This is the way how we describe the extrinsic 
transition. The intrinsic transition is described through the forced adjustment of the 
behaviour of the planned segment to the market situation, which is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
2.3.  Temporal  Equilibrium 
brium, if some positive market prices 
,   exist, such that the equations of market clearing (17m), (18m) and 
(19
 ord  to s
his is an assumption that the agricultural production is able to provide surplus for 
ind cess. 
 
We say the model is in an equili M P 1 ,  M P 2 , 
M r ,  M 2 M 1
m) and the equations of factor utilization (4m), (10m) can be fulfilled. 
In er tudy the property of equilibrium we make following assumptions in 
addition to the assumptions made in the specification of the model. 
w w
 
Assumption 1:  G E M M L L K F δ > ) , (.  
T
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This assumption he rea  says that t l wage (without subsidies and other benefits) must 
above the existence minimum. 
Assumption 3:  2 P L w E E p p δ − < . 
This assumption implies that even nder forced saving the per capita consumption in 
the  t should be abov e existence minimum. 
 
Proposition 1: Under Assumption1 and Assumption 2, if 
 u
planned segmen e th
0 = E  there exists a 
uni e stable equilibrium for the model specified from (1p) to (19m). 
n 3 a
K τ >  and (2) 
the
 U n 3,  w
ry 3.1: If the model is in a disequilibrium state, it will evolve to the 
equilibrium state after some periods. 
oofs of the results see Chen and Hsiao (2005)).   
qu
Proposition 2: Under Assumption 1, Assumption 2, Assumptio nd  0 > E  there 
exists a constant  K τ  such that (1) there is no equilibrium for  P K / K M
re exists a unique stable equilibrium for  K M P K K τ < /.  
Proposition 3: nder Assumption 1, Assumption 2, Assumptio ill grow 
faster than  K . 




Corollary 3.2: Once the model is in an equilibrium state, its evolution will always in 
the equilibrium state (For details of prTHE TRANSITION PROCESS IN CHINA  119 
 
2.4.  Long  Run  Dynamics 
 
The long run dynamic behaviour of the system depends on how fast capital stocks 
grow in each segment. At the beginning of the transition, it holds typically 
will evolve f
te the co




3.    ANALYSIS OF THE DRIVING FORCES OF THE TRANSITION 
3.1
 segment has the pattern of the 
growth in Kalecki’s Model for the centrally planned economy. We assume that the price 
and
K M P K τ > / . Following Proposition 2 there is no equilibrium for the model. According 
to Proposition 3,  Mt Pt K K / will become smaller and smaller. Consequently the system 
rom disequilibrium into equilibrium. We call the process during the 
disequilibrium sta mplementary stage. In this stage the model is overall in 
disequilibrium, the market segment reduces the disequilibrium to some extend but 
cannot totally compensate it.   
According to Proposition 3  P K will grow slower than  M K . Once  K M P K K τ < / 
the model will be in an equilibrium
K
The wage rate in the agricultural sector keeps increasing d g the tran . 
Once it approaches the wage rate in the industrial sector, the labour surplus 
 real wage rate in the market segment will start to increase. The market price for 
industrial product will decrease. The planned segment will face hard competition from 
the market and it is forced to adjust its behaviour to the market situation. We call this 




.  The  Planned  Segment and Kalecki’s Model 
 
In the model, the growth mechanism of the planned
 the wage rate in the planned segment are given exogenously. The increment of 
production can then be determined as follow. 
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2 =  share of 
ption p consum roduction in the planned segment ( 1 = +i c ). Co  with the 
model is a special case with a production function of co turns to scale. 
As 
mparing
fundamental equation of the growth in Kalecki (1972), we see that the equation in our 
nstant re
δ φ −   is independent of the planning decision, the decision about the growth is a 
trade off between the growth rate and the contemporary consumption. This is exactly the 
growth patter
  Index of Real Wage and the Annual Growth Rate of National Income 
Year  Growth rate of national income (%) Index of average real wage 
n described by Kalecki (1972). Because the wage income is the main 
source of consumption, the political desire for quick growth is instrumentalized through 
keeping the wage rate at a low level. The evidence for the pursuit of this policy is the 
fact that in China despite a rather considerable growth rate of the GNP during the sixties 
and seventies, there was no remarkable improvement of the living standard. In fact the 




1952 14(1953)  100 
1957 4.5  127.9 
1962 -6.5  92.1 
1965 17  110.1 
1970 23  105.6 
1975 8.3  107.9 
1980 6.4  124.7 
1981 4.9  123.4 
1982 8.3  124.9 
1983 9.8  126.7 
1984 13.5  145.6 
Sou nese Statistic Year Book (1988), p. 52 and p. 190. 
 
3.2.    The Market Segment and the Dualistic Economic Model 
 
metric treatment 
of the two sectors in market segment.  In our model the dualism lies, first, in the 
diff
 
5 See Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham (1972), p. 8-9. 
rce: Chi
 
The dualistic features of the model are expressed through the asym
5
erent production condition. The production in the agricultural sector is assumed to be THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN CHINA  121 
always more labour intensive than in the industrial sector. Second, the agricultural sector 
is expected to absorb all the labour force, which cannot be utilised in the industrial 
sector. A basic feature of the duality is that the living standard in the rural area and that 
in the urban area are different. Hence, although the wage rate in the industrial sector is 
postulated at a level of existence minimum in the urban areas, the wage rate in the 
agricultural sector lies even lower. Third, we have assumed asymmetric consumer 
expenditure in two sectors. (For simplicity the demand for agricultural product was 
assumed to be inelastic.)   
 
3.3.  The Rural Reform and the Stimulation of a Decentralized Industrialization 
rocess 
 
ese agriculture feeds more than 1 billion people and provides jobs for more 





grated in the planning system through an obligated quantity planning and a strict 
price control. Moreover, peasants were only allowed to engage in the agricultural 
production. Farmers had to deliver to the state the planed amount of food that was 
needed by the people living in the urban area and they had to produce enough food for 
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Figure 1.    Influe  of Planning o e 
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We assume that for the given real wage rate, the optimal decision for the farmer 
would be w nned production 
ause the planned target was obligat , everything had to be done to fulfil the 
pla target. That means more labour input would be used, even if the marginal 
pro











M Y  lower than the pla
P
M Y1 . Bec ory
n 
ductivity was lower than the real wage rate, which is supposed to have reached its 
lower limit other reason for the unprofitabl sing of labour in the agriculture was 
that the agric ure had to absorb all the surp bour that could not be utilised in the 
strial sector.
6 This economic loss through using surplus labour resulted in reduction 
















The capital income could be determined then residually from the difference between 
total income and the labour income. 
M
M M P L w Y P
r
1
1 1 1 1
1
o −
= . If the planned price is so low, 
that the rate of return of capital can only keep pace with the depreciation, t l 
labour productivity will not rise. Consequently, the labour productivity, and thus, the 
living standard of the farmers cannot get decisively improved. Before the reform, the 
low planned price of the agricult he bureaucratically controlled 
destroyed the economic vitality of agriculture, so that a decentralized industrialisation 
became economically impossible, though the technological and demographic condition 
was mature for an industrialization “take-off”. In the Table 2, we can see that from the 
beginning of the sixties to the beginning of the economic reform in 1978, the planned 





ure product and t
production manner had been the main obstacle to the development in the rural area. It 
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Figure 2.    Impact of Rural Reform on Agriculture 
 
 
Table 2. Planned Price Index for Agricultural Products 



















The rising price of agricultural products, as practised at the beginning of the rural 
reform and the decollectivization has given a big push in the development of agriculture. 
There are two direct effects resulting from raising the prices. First, the rising price led to 
increases in the rate of return of capital. The farmers are able to put more capital into 
production, which in turn leads to increases in labour productivity. The production curve 
 
7 After 1994 there did not exist a planned price index.   PU CHEN AND CHIHYING HSIAO  124 
turns upwards. Second, the real wage rate in terms of agricultural price will decrease, 
thus it is more profitable to use the labour force than before the reform. These two 
effects result in increasing production. If the increase of the production is big enough, so 
that the supply of agricultural products at the previous level of the labour input is larger 
than the food demand, the level of employment in the agriculture will go down. 
The marginal productivity will rise in agriculture, so that the improvement of the 
farmers’ living standard is economically founded. From then on, the expansion of the 
capital stock in the rural areas and the labour freed from agriculture will be transferred 
into industrial production. In fact the rural reform changed the institutional condition in 
the agricultural sector in China and released a spontaneous industrialization process. See 
Table 3 for the rapid growth of the industrial production in the rural area. 
 
 













1980  2792.12 1922.6 543.96 179.97  47.14  98.45 
1983  4123.78  2750 826.49 320.88  82.63 143.78 
1984  5067.55  3214.13  1161.31 370.58 132.55 188.98 
1985  6340.04  3619.49  1750.08 510.49 190.42 269.56 
1986 7554.23  4013.01  2380.79  591.93  245.4  323.1 
1987  9431.61 4675.7  3284.86 723.31 334.47 413.27 
1988  12534.69  5865.27  4781.16 895.33 434.44 558.49 
1989 14480.17  6534.73  5886.02  919.17  515.5  624.75 
1990  16619.21  7662.09  6719.13 978.47 579.62  679.3 
1991  19004.09 8057.03  8266.5 1142.32  660.76  777.48 
1992  25386.28 9084.71  12717.09 1570.01  906.04 1108.43 
Share of each Sectors 
Year Total  Agr.  Ind.  Constr.  Transp  Trade 
1980 100  68.86  19.48  6.45  1.69  3.53 
1983 100  66.69  20.04  7.78  2.00  3.49 
1984 100  63.43  22.92  7.31  2.62  3.73 
1985 100  57.09  27.60  8.05  3.00  4.25 
1986 100  53.12  31.52  7.84  3.25  4.28 
1987 100  49.57  34.83  7.67  3.55  4.38 
1988 100  46.79  38.14  7.14  3.47  4.46 
1989 100  45.13  40.65  6.35  3.56  4.31 
1990 100  46.10  40.43  5.89  3.49  4.09 
1991 100  42.40  43.50  6.01  3.48  4.09 
1992 100  35.79  50.09  6.18  3.57  4.37 
Source: Chinese Statistic Year Book (1993), p. 333.
8
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3.4.    Advantages in the Market Segment 
 
In an economy with two subsystems organised by different principles, the vitality of 
a subsystem can be judged on the rate of growth of that subsystem. The rate of return of 
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Denote the second factor of the middle term in the equation above by H. It can be 
easily shown that H is independent of K but depends decreasingly on the real wage rate. 
Using this result we can calculate the ratio of the growth rates in the two segments.
9 We 
denote the growth rates of capital stock by   and   for the planned segment and 
the market segment respectively. 




M M M M





P w H P








In this formula the advantage in the market segment in terms of the rate of growth of 
the capital stock can be traced back to three advantages in the market segment. The first 
one is the price advantage. Producers from the market segment can take advantage of the 
shortage situation and always sell their products at a higher price. It holds that . 
The second one is the wage advantage. Owing to the large labour reserve in the 
agricultural sector, the industrial enterprises of the market segment are facing an almost 
unlimited labour supply, especially at the beginning of the transition, when the demand 
for labour is relatively small. Therefore, they can hire the labour at lower wage 
rate . The third one is the advantage of more efficient production. In the 
previous discussion, we have always assumed that the production technologies are the 
same in both segments. There are some good reasons, why the production in the market 
segment is more efficient than that in the planned segment. The most important one is 
the selectivity of the investment: The enterprises of the market segment do not need to 
cover every sector of the economy. They produce only in the most profitable sectors 
through selective investment, while the enterprises of planned economy have to cover all 
the branches, where some production will be unprofitable. Consequently, with the same 
amount of resources, more goods and service can be produced in the market segment than 
in the planned segment. Better management is another important reason for more efficient 
production in the market segment. See Table 4 for the faster growth of the market segment. 
P M P P 2 2 >
P M w w 2 2 <
 
9 We neglect the depreciation in the following discussion to simplify the discussion, because its effects on the 
two segments do not change the relative advantage/disadvantage of any segment.   PU CHEN AND CHIHYING HSIAO  126 
Table 4.    Gross Output Value of Industry (100 Mio.) 
Year State-owned  enterprises Township- and village enterprises/ 
non-state-owned enterprises 
Ratio 
1978 3289  358  0.11 
1979 3673  423  0.12 
1980 3915  509  0.13 
1981 4037  579  0.14 
1982 4326  646  0.15 
1983 4739  757  0.16 
1984 5262  1245  0.24 
1985 6302  1827  0.29 
1986 6971  2413  0.35 
1987 8250  3243  0.39 
1988 10351  4529  0.44 
1989 12342  5244  0.42 
1990 13063  6050  0.46 
1991 14954  8780  0.59 
1992 17824  13635  0.76 
1993 22724  23446  1.03 
1994 26200  32336  1.23 
1995 31220     
1996 36173     
1997 35968     
1998 33621  67737  2.01 
1999 35571  72707  2.04 
2000 40554  85673  2.11 
2001 42408  95448  2.25 
2002 45178  110776  2.45 
2003 53403  142271  2.66 
Sources
10: Chinese Statistic Year Book (1993), p. 396 and p. 412; Chinese Statistic Year Book (1995), p. 365 
and p. 379; Chinese Statistic Year Book (2004), p. 524. (Since 1998 the numbers in the third column are the 








10 Although it is questionable, whether the sudden changes in the figures of 1984 and 1992 are reliable, there 
is no doubt that the TVEs are playing an increasingly important role in the economy. THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN CHINA  127 
3.5.    Industrialisation and the Impact on the Intrinsic Transition 
 
At the outset the urban minimum wage exceeds the competitive level and draws rural 
labour into the industrial sector. The industrial sector faces an “unlimited supply of 
labour” and the minimum wage can prevail. Labour force is engaged in three groups of 
employment: the industrial production of the planned segment, the industrial production 
and the agricultural production of the market segment. During the transition from plan to 
market, the industrialisation process is going on. The labour movement from the 
agricultural sector into the industrial sector proceeds continuously. 
As the growth of the capital stock is much faster than the growth of the labour force 
(we have assumed a constant labour supply), the overall labour intensity decreases with 
time and so does the rental-wage ratio. From the equation (5m) and (6m) we know, that 
the price of industrial products will decrease. This process will go on until the market 
price falls below the planned price. At least from this time point on, the planned segment 
will be forced to follow the market price; otherwise no one would buy the products at 
the planned price. In this case, the planned segment obviously cannot survive in the 
system, if it does not adjust itself to the market situation.
11
The consideration above suggests the conclusion, that the industrialisation is crucial 
to the transition from plan to market. As long as the industrialisation is further 
progressing, the thorough removal of the planned segment will be inevitable; the only 
one exception is that the planned segment behaves just like the market segment. 
 
3.6.  Savings  and  the Financial Market 
 
A more realistic assumption about saving is   and , 
where    are the saving fractions of labour income in the market segment, the 
plan segment and the saving fraction of capital income, respectively. 
1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ r wM s s 1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ r wP s s
r wP wM s s s , ,
For the long run behaviour of the system, it becomes now essential, how the savings 
from the labour income are distributed in the two segments. We assume that the savings 
of the capital income will be used for the investment in the same segment. We use κ to 
denote the share of savings from labour income which is used for investment in the plan 
segment. The capital stock accumulation in the two segments can be described through 
the following two equations. We denote the sum of savings from the labour income 
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11 In fact the forced adjustment took place continuously during the economic reform in China. See Chen and 
Hsiao (2005) for more detailed discussion.   PU CHEN AND CHIHYING HSIAO  128 
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M κ δ ρ − + + − =
Δ
= .                            
 
The difference between   and   is key to the 
dynamic behaviour of the system. The difference depends on the rate of return in both 
segments. It depends also on the distribution of saved labour income. If there is no 
competitive financial market, which is still the case in China, the flow of the financial 
asset will run according to administrative rules. The simplest rule is that the distribution 
is held at a fixed ratio κ. Then the planned segment may take a constant share in the 
economy. 
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3.7.  Welfare  Effect  of  Transition 
 
It is well known that welfare concept is much more comprehensive than just a single 
object of real income.
12 Constrained by the model structure, the welfare effect will be 
only examined in this partial aspect. In this paper the participants of the economy during 
the transition process can be roughly divided into 4 groups: farmers, who are engaged in 
the agricultural production, farmer-workers, who were farmers and became industrial 
workers during the industrialisation process, workers of the state-owned enterprises, and 
capitalists, who own the capital stocks. At the early stage of the economic reform, 
farmers had benefited from the rural reform through rising price of agricultural products 
and freeing up of the market for agricultural products. During the transition process 
accompanied by the industrialisation process, labourers moved continuously from the 
agricultural sector into the industrial sector. The marginal productivity increased in the 
agricultural sector, so that farmers’ income rose continuously. Although farmers’ 
income was the lowest among the four groups, farmers were facing improving living 
standards. Hence, they are happy with the reform policies, as long as the improvement 
continues. 
Farmer-workers improved their living standard through moving into the industrial 
employment. They earn more than their former colleagues, who remained in the 
countryside. In this sense, they are grateful to the reform policy. However, they have to 
lead a rather hard live in the urban area. Owing to the excess supply of labour, their real 
income will be fixed on the minimum level. They faced the fact that they earned more 
and they had to spend more for living. Hence, their attitude to the reform is twofold. On 
the one hand, they were grateful to the reform policy that got the chance to work in 
industry and could improve their living standards in comparison to the situation before 
the reform. On the other hand, they will always complain about that the reform cannot 
give them further improvement of living standard. 
Workers of the state-owned enterprises cannot profit directly from the transition 
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process, because their wage rate was determined through the planning. They might 
suffer from a loss of welfare due to the rising prices, which is caused by the higher 
prices in the market segment. However, with the progress of reform in the state-owned 
enterprises, the enterprises have gained comprehensive autonomy. The managers of the 
enterprises raised the income of the workers through raising the share of premium in the 
total wage. From 1987 to 1993 the share of tariff wage fell from 85.8% to 50%. 
According to this fact, the central planning did not play the decisive role any more in the 
wage determination. It raises naturally the question, how is the wage rate determined in 
the state-owned enterprises during the economic reform. Neither the theory of marginal 
productivity nor the efficiency wage model can provide a sufficient explanation to the 
phenomena, because statistics show that the increase of wage rate in the state-owned 
enterprises is larger than the increase of productivity. Obviously, the managers of the 
state-owned enterprises have taken the growth of real income of the workers of their 
enterprises into their object function.
13 These wage increases in the state-owned 
enterprises are partly responsible for the fall of profit rate in the state-owned enterprises 
during the transition process which will threaten the existence of the state-owned 
enterprises and thus the existence of the workers. Therefore, without significant 
technical progress, the improvement of the living standard of the workers of the 
state-owned enterprises cannot continue during the transition process. 
The capitalists have profited the most through the transition process. At the early 
stage of the reform the capital rate of return was very high. With the expansion of the 
market segment and the capital stocks, the rate of return will go down. A new 
entrepreneur class is slowly forming during the transition process. This class is naturally 
the support of reform policy.   
 
3.8.  Feasible  Transition  Path 
 
Although the evolution path depends on the initial condition and the political 
intervention and is hence not unique, the development of the economic system will go 
through several similar stages along each feasible successful transition path. 
At the early stage, when the market segment comes into existence, the capital stock 
of the market segment is small. The unsatisfied demand for consumer goods provides a 
ready market for the products, so that the new producers can get an easy start in the 
consumer sector.   
With the emerging of the market segment in the economy, the supply situation is 
improved. The whole economy grows faster and becomes more flexible in production 
and resource allocation. Owing to the limited production capacity in the market segment 
at the earlier stage of the transition, not all deficits in supply of consumer goods can be 
covered. The unsatisfied consumer demand becomes forced saving. The planned 
 
13 Wing Thye Woo has argued for this behaviour in Wing Thye Woo (1994), P. 286.   PU CHEN AND CHIHYING HSIAO  130 
segment is still dominant in the economy. The main features of the CPE, such as 
shortage of supply, fixed prices and rigid factor allocation, still prevailed in the economy. 
In general the market segment plays a complimentary role in the economy. We call this 
stage the complementary stage. 
Since the price advantage is large in the complementary stage, the market segment 
grows very fast in the complementary stage. The second stage begins, when the 
production of the market segment can cover all the supply deficit of the consumption 
goods of the planned segment and expands into the production of investment goods. The 
market segment becomes more and more an independent economic sub-system. 
During this stage, the growth rate in the market segment is larger than that in the 
planned segment. The price advantage, the wage advantage and the production 
advantage support faster growth in the market segment, though the price advantage is 
decreasing in this stage. The overall economic situation is much more market-like. The 
features of centrally planned economy (CPE) exist only within the planned segment and 
are not significant for the whole economy anymore. In this stage, both the planned 
segment and the market segment develop well. We call this stage the development stage. 
Facing faster growth in the market segment and a continuously shrinking share of the 
planned segment in the economy, the policy makers are motivated to carry out reform to 
adjust the planned segment to the new economic situation. All the policies are aimed at 
accelerating the growth in the planned segment through catching up the advantage of the 
market segment. However, the advantages of the market segment can only be 
completely neutralised, if all the planning decisions in the planned segment will coincide 
with that in the market segment. This implies that the planned segment would become 
itself a market segment. We call this stage, the voluntary adjustment stage. 
Parallel to the transition process, the industrialisation process is going on. The labour 
movement takes place continuously. With the increasing of the labour productivity in the 
agricultural sector, the wage difference between industry and agriculture is getting 
smaller and smaller. The labour surplus is reducing with time. The fourth stage begins, 
when the labour surplus disappears. At this stage, the real wage in the market segment 
will rise. As soon as the real wage in the market segment reaches that in the planned 
segment, the competition from the market segment will really threaten the existence of 
the planned segment. The planned segment can only survive in the system, if it performs 
just the same as the market segment. This implies, that the planned segment has to 
become itself a market segment, otherwise it will not survive in the system. Hence, we 
call this stage the forced adjustment stage. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
The transition from plan to market in China characterised by “growing out of plan” 
is typically dominated by the extrinsic transition, where the growth, especially the faster 
growth of the market segment, is the most important driving force of the transition. This THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN CHINA  131 
particular Chinese way of transition is marked by a decentralised industrialisation 
process during the reform era. 
Before the economic reform, the Chinese economy followed the Soviet-type 
industrialization via central planning that choked the decentralized industrialization 
mechanism, though the technological and demographical condition was already mature 
for the industrialization “take-off”. The economic reform led by the rural reform has 
changed the mechanism of the industrialisation. The improved income on the rural area, 
the existing technological condition, the liberalised economic environment and the 
established incentive stimulated and enforced the decentralised industrialisation process. 
A market economic segment emerged during this process. The market segment took 
advantage of the existing planned segment and could get a faster development than the 
planned segment. This formed the particular Chinese way of transition. 
The intrinsic transition in China can be viewed as the adjustment process of the 
planned segment to the continuously changing economic situation, driven by the market 
force. The price reform could reduce the price disadvantage of the planned segment 
against the market segment and accelerate the growth in the planned segment. The 
reform on the labour market would reduce the disadvantage in the labour using in the 
long run. However, with these reform policies, the planned segment loses his planned 
economic nature. The disadvantages can only be totally removed if the planned segment 
can perform identically as the market segment, which implies that the planned segment 
would become itself a market segment.   
The reform of the financial market is a key factor to the transition process. If the 
financial market is still administratively controlled and a “favour-planned-segment” 
policy is pursued, the transition process will end at a certain constant mixture with the 
planned segment on the one side and the market segment on the other. If the financial 
market runs somehow competitively, then the market segment will dominate in the long 
run. 
The welfare effects of transition vary over different groups of people and over 
different periods during the transition. Therefore, the transition will promise a golden 
future for the Chinese people only if the technical progress enforced by the transition 







Summary of the Model 
 
In summary the whole model consists of 31 variables with 26 independent equations 
and 5 exogenous variables. The following is a list of the variables: 
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List of variables 
1  P P 2   the planned price for industrial goods  Exogenous 
2  P w   the planned wage rate in the industrial sector  Exogenous 
3  P K2   the capital stock in the industrial sector of the planned segment  Exogenous 
4  P L2   the employed labour in the industrial sector of the planned segment  Endogenous 
5  P I2   the amount of the produced investment goods  Endogenous 
6  P C2   the amount of the produced consumer goods  Endogenous 
7  P Y2   the amount of the industrial products  Endogenous 
8  P r   the rate of return in the planned economic segment  Endogenous 
9  d
P NC   the demand for consumption from the planned segment  Endogenous 
10  d
P NI   the demand for investment from the planned segment  Endogenous 
11  E   the shortage of the supply for consumer goods in the planned segment Endogenous 
12  M K1   the capital stock in the agricultural sector of the market segment  Endogenous 
13  M K2   the capital stock in the industrial sector of the market segment  Endogenous 
14  M P 1   the market price for the agricultural goods  Endogenous 
15  M P 2   the market price for the industrial goods  Endogenous 
16  M L1   the labour employed in the agricultural sector  Endogenous 
17  M L2   the labour employed in the industrial sector of the market segment  Endogenous 
18  M L   the total labour employed in the market segment  Endogenous 
19  M Y1   the amount of agricultural goods produced in the market segment    Endogenous 
20  M Y2   the amount of industrial goods produced in the market segment  Endogenous 
21  M r 1   the rate of return of capital in the agricultural sector  Endogenous 
22  M r2   the rate of return of capital in the industrial sector  Endogenous 
23  M K   the total capital stock in the market segment  Exogenous 
24  M w2   the market wage rate in the industrial sector  Endogenous 
25  M w1   the market wage rate in the agricultural sector  Endogenous 
26  M I2   the produced investment goods in the market segment  Endogenous 
27  M C2   the produced consumer goods in the market segment  Endogenous 
28  d
M Y1   the demand for the agricultural products  Endogenous 
29  d
M NC   the nominal demand for consumption from the market segment  Endogenous 
30  d
M NI   the nominal demand for investment from the market segment  Endogenous 
31 
G L   total labour force  Exogenous 
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